has been the subject reverse-chronological dramaturgy interweaves the spectators' cognitiveanalytical attempts to ensure causal-linear coherency together with a corporalaffective sensation of temporal loss remains underexplored. This I believe is due to the inability of prevalent narratological terms of cutting across the current divide and uniting on the same conceptual plane the cinematic spheres of the cognitive-analytical, evaluative, and interpretative, on the one hand, with the visceral, haptic, and sensory-affective, on the other hand. As an attempt to carve out a conceptual ground where these key facets of the manner, I propose an embodied reconceptualization of the cognitive-formalist concept of the fabula. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to dispute a series of dominant assumptions about cinematic spectatorship and narrative comprehension that automatically come with this narratological concept. 
Shelby (Guy Pearce), who suffers from anterograde amnesia. Although generally hailed as a landmark in nonlinear storytelling, Memento compels its viewers to be more engaged with linear reasoning than most classical Hollywood narratives. perception and thus envisages the cinematic spectator as an active participant constructing -rather than passively receiving -narrative sense. Noticing this aspect
Memento "chimes with cognitivist theories of narrative that emphasise the roles of rational inference-making, the testing and adjusting of beliefs, and the cognitive matching of affective tone with perceptual awareness" (2011, 48 ). Yet, due to its ability to distort our sense of temporality, Memento also poses a challenge to theories of cinematic spectatorship based on cognitive appraisals, evaluations, and interpretations, 2 because it explicates the emotional and affective underpinnings of narration (cf. Hogan 2012) .
Memento narrative world or environment thus forces us to reconsider the cognitive and representational dominance within narratology. 3 Of special interest to this article of the Russian formalists' narratological distinction between the fabula (the story's state of affairs and events as inferred by the viewer and organized into a chronological and casual order) and the (the actual arrangement of the visible and audible events in the narrative) (Bordwell 2007, 14) . However, it shall be argued that the fabula does not arise from a cognitive picking up of relevant spectator that activates feedback loops in the perceptual, emotional, affective, cognitive, and sensory-motor circuits. 4 
2
In brief, the cognitive appraisal theory of emotion argues that people's personal interpretations of a perspective is typically assumed by cognitive-formalist theories on narrative comprehension 3 Although this article emphasizes their interdependence, it is useful to draw a conceptual distinction between cognition, emotion, and affect. While the term cognition "collectively refers to a variety of higher mental processes such as thinking, perceiving, imagining, speaking, acting and planning" (Ward 2010, 4) , it is primarily used to designate mental activities associated with informationprocessing, judgements, evaluations, attention, and problem-solving. The differentiation between emotion and affect is more problematic, as cognitivists generally do not draw such a distinction. However, I believe it to be useful to reserve the term emotion for subjective and object-oriented feelings. Affect, on the other hand, cannot be simply attached to a particular feature or object and 4 perception, emotion, cognition, motor action) (cf. Grodal 2009 ). In addition, Vittorio Gallese's embodied In performing a reconceptualization of the cognitive-formalist concept of the fabula, this article is informed by a steadily growing body of works that carve out the embodied nature of the cinematic experience.
5 It is, however, crucial that the increased focus on the cinematic body does not amount to a reversal of the mindbody dichotomy of classical cognition such that the affective is conceptualized as an autonomous sphere to be studied in isolation from higher cognitive processes and hermeneutic analysis. 6 On this ground, the embodied fabula is a conceptual tool answering the plead of William Brown to synthesize "with the haptic, or affective, elements of the cinematic experience the 'higher' 'brain' elements that in fact form a continuum with them" (2013, 141).
Linearity and Nonlinearity: Memento's Exploration of Cinema's Temporal Modalities
Memento perfectly illustrates the affect-emotion-cognition continuum which becomes activated as the spectators embody the cinematic world unfolding before David Bordwell and others, while simultaneously demonstrating how cognition, and consequently narrative comprehension, is co-constituted in corporal affects and emotional responses to the cinematic event. In introducing the concept of the embodied fabula, this article attempts to incorporate into a common conceptual activation of a (narrative) desire for causal-linearity, our corporal-mental efforts to achieve such, and our sensory-affective temporal simulation theory -based on research in the mirror neuron system -provides a model for the intimate connection between the audiovisual stream of images and the brain-body (cf. Gallese 5 Guerra 2012. 6 In recent years, the concept of affect has been principal for the formulation of a more direct the work of Brian Massumi, can be differentiated from cognition and emotion, which we have or possess thus not to be attributed to a self-identical Cartesian individual (2002, . Affect is thus emotion and affect useful, I am sceptical towards a radical disconnection of affect from the emotional and cognitive sphere. The problem with such a disjunction is that it utilizes the concept of affect to inverse the Cartesian dualism separating affect (body) from cognition (mind) (cf. Leys 2011) . See Brinkema (2014) for a recent intervention in the study of affect that does not oppose this concept to critical inquiry, interpretation, and formal and aesthetic concerns.
disorientations that arise from such attempts to master the narrative. 7 As it shall become evident, this procedure is not straightforward, given that an embodied reconceptualization of the fabula the concept of narration.
8 In order to understand this claim better, it is useful to consider how Memento both invokes and challenges the way the cognitiveformalist fabula copes with narrative temporality.
Once confronted with the idea of Memento in fact it's very linear just in reversed chronology" (Nolan 2012) . In fact, the linear Klein (2001) , the narrative structure can be illustrated according to an intricate yet systematic scheme where the coloured, reverse chronological scenes (A, B, C, etc.) are separated from the black-and-white, chronological scenes (1, 2, 3, etc.). Klein's suggestion provides us with the following visualization of the narrative structure: Credits, 1, V, 2, U, 3, T, 4, S, 5, R, 6, Q, 7, P, 8, O, 9, N, 10, M, 11, L, 12, K, 13 J, 14, I, 15, H, 16, G, 17, F, 18, E, 19, D, 20, C, 21, B, 22/A. Each reverse chronological sequence is interrupted by a black-and-white scene from which a new reverse chronological sequence follows, etc. Scene 22/A is pivotal in relation to this, since this is where the two narrative threads merge. The black-and-white scene 22, as Klein observes, "almost imperceptibly slips into color and, in an almost vertiginous intellectual loop, becomes (in real-world 7 For an alternative attempt to synthesize the affective and cognitive aspects of narrative comprehension see Daniel Yacavone's (2015) . 8
While this article centres on how the notion of embodiment allows us to expand the concept of the fabula, such an approach inevitably gestures at a broader embodied rethinking of narratology beyond the scope of this article. If the fabula, as this article suggests, grows out representational string of events that can be isolated from the spectator's corporal-affective and emotional experience and construction of these events. The pertinent task becomes to describe the continuum between corporal experiences and higher-order representations. One possible place to start is to expand upon the argument made by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in narration must depart with disembodiment but be seen as arising from the nature of embodied experience (and our engagement with the environment). As the authors declare, " [t] his is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason [and, I add, to construct narratives] itself comes from the details of our embodiment" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4) . fabula), which can be translated into the following structure: 1, 2, 3 ,4 ,5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 , 22/A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, Credits (in reverse).
In versions, yet anyone who has watched both versions of Memento is likely to have had two qualitatively different experiences of those events. Logically, both versions focus their narrative attention on Leonard's memory system -consisting of mementos in the form of annotated photographs, notes, and tattoos for the provoking a matching feeling of temporal disorientation in the spectators. The surplus value of the original version pertains to a nonlinear dimension of Memento, which is not captured by the cognitive-formalist fabula. 9 In an very much yourself. And when I listen to [Radiohead's album ], no matter how many times I listen to it, I don't know what comes next" (Nolan in Timberg 2001, 14) . Once our narrative comprehension is attuned to "the construction of a 9 rearranged. In brief, complexity theory holds that the overall behaviour of a nonlinear or complex system cannot be explained by reference to the sum of its individual components. As Robert Pepperell explains, this "means that even though we may be able to break up a system into its constituent parts, we will not be able to learn about the global behaviour of the system more or less intelligible story" (Bordwell 1985, 33 ) -the default mode assumed in most cognitivist scholarship -, this narrative dimension is easily lost, ignored, or simply deemed a disturbing side effect. 10 We thus need to supplement the analytical fabula of Memento cognitive-analytical, intersubjective, and chronological reorganization of story events) with an "online," embodied counterpart capable of incorporating the 11
The Fabula and the "Classical Sandwich" of Narrative Comprehension
The cognitive-formalist fabula is constructed as spectators pick up the cues of organize the perceptual cues in the plot into a coherent and comprehensible mental whole" (Coëgnarts and Kravanja 2012, 87) . 12 In this conception, the fabula is an abstract mental entity that nonetheless dominates our perception of the cinematic material, which is being constantly (re-)interpreted to accommodate the construction is the fabula in this conception predisposed to causal-linearity (being a "spatiotemporal realm in which the action unfolds in chronological order" [Bordwell 2007, 110] ), it participates in an ongoing linearization of how the cinematic material is experienced. Bordwell has been criticized for endorsing a too abstract conception of schemata, isolating it from both language and the body (Buckland 2003, 31) . Such Film (1985) . Here the author separable from his or her emotional responses" (1985, 30) . 13 10 Consequently, Bordwell believes "Nolan's real achievement […] is to make his reverse-order 11 cognition. Whereas online cognition refers to our immediate engagement with the environment (corresponding to our ongoing construction of the fabula during the screening of Memento engagement is the more abstract, hypothetical imagining of events decoupled from the actual environment of concern (corresponding to the analytical fabula). It is crucial to note that within embodied cognition both these forms of cognition are perceived to be body-based (cf. Wilson 2002) . 12 Within the cognitive sciences, schemata "are cognitive structures representing generic knowledge, i.e. structures which do not contain information about particular entities, instances or events, but rather about their general form" (Emmott and Alexander 2009, 411) . 13 Yet, it shall be noted that Bordwell in later works appears more willing to accept the corporal aspect of mental schemata. This is, for instance, the case when he observes how "[m]ore and more activities seem traceable to humans' super-sensitive natural endowment […] As research I will argue that this modus operandi, which mirrors what the philosopher Susan Hurley (2002) has labelled the "classical sandwich" model of cognition, also dominates cognitive approaches dealing explicitly with emotion and affect in cinema. In brief, Hurley's metaphor of the sandwich encapsulates a position within the study of cognition which "regards perception as input from world to mind, action as output from mind to world, and cognition as sandwiched between" (2008, 2). The core assumption that Hurley wants to criticize with the metaphor of the classical sandwich is that action, perception, and thought can be ontologically dissociated. However, as Vittorio Gallese and Hannah Wojciehowski have pointed out, in conceiving action and perception as separate modular domains, classical cognitivism neglects "both the intertwine character of perception and action and their crucial contribution to cognitive processes" (2011, 11) .
Narration in the Fiction
My thesis is that the concept of fabula -when understood as an inferential and in Narration in the Fiction Film. Carl Plantinga, a prominent proponent of the cognitive-evaluative stance to emotions in cinema explains that "a cognitive approach holds that an emotional state is one in which some physical state of felt agitation is caused by an individual's construal and evaluation of his situation" (1997, 378) . The advantage of this approach is that it moves beyond the Western dichotomization of emotion and reason since it allows cognitive researchers "to discuss emotion states in terms of goals, objects, characteristics, behaviors, judgements, and motivations" (Plantinga and Smith 1999a, 3) . However, in focusing only on the cognitive dimension of emotions, this position risks reducing the corporal-affectivity of cinema to the cognitive-evaluation of narrative events. As a counter-reaction to the cognitive-evaluative position, recent decades have seen an increased interest in embodiment and affect. While work conducted here has shed valuable light on the many ways affect cannot simply be subsumed under the category of cognition, it has also left a remarkable gap between cognition and affect. With the concept of the embodied fabula, the aim is to integrate both the affective and cognitive domains into a larger conceptual framework capable cinematic medium. An intriguing, yet all too often ignored aspect of Memento symbolic operations (e.g. the reorganization of the narrative continuum), affective goes on, many 'higher-order' activities will probably be revealed as grounded in a rich perceptual system present at birth but awaiting activation and tuning from the environment" (2007, 45). incitements (e.g. a sensation of temporal loss providing another perspective on Leonard's amnesia), and emotional involvement (e.g. the intuitive rather than rational sympathy towards Leonard's self-righteous project).
From Embodied Cognition to the Embodied Fabula
An example of the intricate manner in which cinema brings cognitive, emotional, and affective undertakings to engage can be found in how Memento on several levels instigates an alignment between Leonard and the spectator. This alignment is cognitive-epistemological, because the narrative structure restrains our knowledge in a manner comparable to how Leonard is restrained by his shortterm memory. However, this alignment also operates at a corporal-affective level, because not only is our access to information limited, we also feel limited and restrained in regards to our own memory capabilities as we are trying to work out the narrative. In addition, the alignment is sustained by classical cinematic emotional and affective markers such as facial close-ups, the musical score, camera angles, and colour schemes (cf. Renner 2006) .
To exemplify the different modes of experience invoked by Memento, consider the following three viewer-reactions highlighted by Stefano Ghislotti (2003):
Viewer 1: "I've seen the movie three times now and may have to watch it ten more times until I get it all straightened out."
Viewer 2: "This movie was brilliant because it totally got me dizzy... never before can I recall concentrating so hard on what was going on... eventually, I hit a mind warp and got totally lost forgetting how things ended thus making the facts in the beginning a dizzying of feelings and a distortion of my OWN memory."
Viewer 3: "I loved this movie because it made me feel as if I had a short-term These comments illustrate the interrelation between aspects of the cinematic experience that are cognitive-analytical (the straightening out of the narrative), affective-embodied (a "dizzying of feelings and a distortion of my OWN memory"), stem from three different viewers, I believe each alludes to the same interrelated experience. Whereas the cognitive-formalist fabula embodied fabula comprises all three.
Memento is unique since it renders evident the need to unite our corporalaffective and cognitive-analytical engagements with cinema into a nonhierarchical and recursive framework. Thus, an analysis of the cognitive activities of the spectators in reorganizing the narrative elements into a coherent fabula is incomplete without an account of how such activities interact and co-constitute the temporal sensations and disorientations that play an equal part in shaping our 14 In reconceptualizing the fabula as a tool situated in the direct encounter mental, and cognitive activities of cinematic spectatorship as being embodied.
the cinematic spectator, but also to studies that more broadly have argued for the centrality of corporal processes in relation to questions of consciousness, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1992) . Memento provides a perfect illustration of embodied cognition because it relies heavily on how spectators perform ordinary cognitive tasks (e.g. problem-solving, temporal re-integration, logical inferences) to organize the narrative continuum in terms of causal-linearity (Ghislotti 2009 ), but demonstrates that these activities do not ensure an analytically-detached mode of spectatorship driven solely by cognitive evaluations, interpretations, and computations. Instead, such enterprises must be considered as mutually constitutive with more direct, embodied -sensory-motor, corporal, affective, and emotional -modes of appreciating the cinematic universe.
The term embodied thus points towards a renewed conception of narrative comprehension not constituted in the idea that we relate to the cinematic world and the characters inhabiting it primarily through "mind-reading" or mental simulation. 15 Although such may play an important part in how cinematic 14 nature of the cognitions, emotions, and affects that emanate from engaging with Memento's Bianco (2004) . 15 Here "mind-reading" refers to theories within psychology and philosophy attempting to explain how we can understand and predict the mental and emotional states, the goals, motifs, and mood of others. According to what has become known as theory theory, we are capable of this due to "our theories of folk psychology, which are made up of a set of law-like generalizations that connect various mental states with other mental states, with external circumstances, and with overt behaviour" (Coplan 2009, 104) . A competing view is the simulation theory according worlds are experienced, they must be seen as merely components of a more encompassing process in which the spectators embody the cinematic space-time.
Although Memento engages us with quite an amount of analytical backwards reasoning, it ultimately evidences how the cinematic experience "is meaningful not to the side of our bodies but because of our bodies" (emphasis in original, Sobchack 2004, 60) . To capture this process, I use the fabula-term because it more than the constructivist nature of narrative comprehension. At the same time, however, I maintain that the fabula in its Bordwellian conception is used primarily to refer to a cognitive-analytical and detached conception of the "story" as something that can be theoretically isolated from the viewers' emotional and affective responses. Consequently, the fabula term is often reserved to what I have referred to as the analytical fabula. While not denying the usefulness of this term, the embodied fabula serves as a reminder that narration is a dynamic process growing out of our bodily experiences as we engage with the cinematic material. Even when we are engaged in an analytical linearization of the story to achieve a sense of spatio-temporal and causal-linear orientation within the narrative universe, our mode remains embodied insofar as the body shapes higher-level cognitions (cf. Gallagher 2005) . The analytical mode of narrative comprehension that dominates cognitive-formalism is thus not eradicated, but rather subsumed into a more encompassing embodied approach to narrative comprehension. 16 to which "we attempt to determine what others think, feel, and desire by simulating their mental states, that is, attempting to adopt their perspective, using our own mind to model theirs under certain conditions" (Coplan 2009, 104 ). Yet, I believe 'simulation' occurs not only on the higher-level of cognitive processing, but also more directly on the immediate, intuitive, preconscious, and corporal-affective level. This is the core argument of embodied simulation Gallese and Guerra argue: "we map the actions of others onto our own motor representations, as well as others' emotions and sensations onto our own viscero-motor and sensory-motor representations" (2012, 206) . In her latest article, Patricia Pisters (2014) argues convincingly for the possibility of uniting mind-reading models with embodied simulation theory for a richer understanding of how cinema generates empathy. 16 Although the embodied reconceptualization of the fabula is a move away from -to use Bordwell's own words -the "too-sapient viewer" (2011) of Narration in the Fiction Film (1985) , his now classical narratological study nevertheless offers an advanced description of the core operations of a particular analytical attitude to cinematic narration. Defending himself against an overall disinterest in the emotional aspects of cinema, Bordwell claims that this is not problematic as long as we acknowledge that his theory is concerned with "only one aspect of our experience of narrative" (2007, 9) .
Resituating the Fabula in the Cinematic Experience
causal-linear terms, Memento makes us sensitive towards temporal layers that otherwise remain imperceptible. In relation to this, it has been argued that the can be seen as a meta-time travel story insofar as it is "not one told by cinema, its story about memory loss back on its viewers, Memento allows us to become cognitively, emotionally, and affectively immersed in its narrative world. The embodied fabula per se. In fact, the embodied fabula designates a cinematic realm in which it no longer makes sense to obtain philosophical coupling of the brain and the screen. In a famous passage, Deleuze explicates: "The brain is unity. The brain is the screen.
[…] The circuits and linkages of the brain don't preexist the stimuli, corpuscles, and particles [grains] images. Cinema, precisely because it puts the image in motion, or rather endows the image with self-motion [auto-mouvement], never stops tracing the circuits of the brain. Cinema not only puts movement in the image, it also puts movement in the mind. Spiritual life is the movement of the mind. One naturally goes from philosophy to cinema, but also from cinema to philosophy" (2000, 366) .
In evoking this notoriously ambiguous and highly debated coupling of the brain and the screen, my claim is that the embodied fabula arises from a realm in which these two remain to be differentiated. This means that the affects, emotions, and cognitions pertaining to the cinematic experience can be discerned but not meaningfully isolated from one another and from the audiovisual cinematic input ("the brain is unity," "the brain is the screen"). Rather than departing from a mode of operation based on isolation and disjunction, the embodied fabula turns to cinematic assemblages based on a recognition of the mutual interdependency and co-constitution of entities traditionally separated in the cognitive-formalist fabula, cognitive and the affective. In relation to this, two concepts -the cinesthetic subject as developed by Vivian Sobchack (2004) and the surrogate body or Leihkörper 2014b)
18 -might be useful in resituating the notion of embodied fabula in the actual cinematic experience. For Sobchack and Voss, it is not enough to conceptualize of producing its own corporality. Following Sobchack, the cinesthetic subject is "constituted at the movies as ambiguously located both 'here ' off-screen and 'there' onscreen" (2004, 72) . In this fashion, cinematic spectatorship arises synesthetically and coenaesthetically, i.e. in and through the whole sensory-mechanisms of the body. 19 Sobchack's Merleau-Ponty-inspired phenomenological approach to the cinematic experience is, however, not interested in questions about narration but rather investigates the "primary structures, founded in existence and constitutive of conscious experience" (Sobchack 1992, 8) .
Where Sobchack thus opposes the phenomenal experience with the semanticphilosopher Christiane Voss maintains that illusions (and hence narrative universes) in cinema should be understood in terms of how they emerge from a sensory-affective resonance with the audiovisual stream of images. Drawing upon John Dewey's philosophy of aesthetics, Voss regards the aesthetics of cinema as "an irreducible and simultaneously reciprocally dynamic relation of aesthetic presentation and reception" (2011, 138) . Voss maintains that cinematic narratives cannot be reduced to a brute cognitive apprehension of a cinematic "text" but arise instead from a "loan body" given to us in the direct cinematic encounter: "My thesis is that it is only the spectator's body, in its mental and sensorial-affective resonance with the events onscreen, which […] 'loans' a three-dimensional body third dimension of the sensing body. The spectator thus becomes a temporary 'surrogate body' for the screen, and this body is, for its part, a constituent feature theories, agency is distributed not only to the spectator, who organizes the narrative, but also to the image in its capability of affecting and moving 18 The term surrogate body is the suggestion made by Inga Pollmann to translate the German noun Leihkörper, which literally brings together the words "loan" and "body" (cf. Voss 2011). 19 As Sobchack explains, besides the word cinema, the term cinesthetic draws on synaesthesia and coenaesthesia. In common usage, synaesthesia refers "not only to an involuntary transfer of feeling among the senses but also to the volitional use of metaphors in which terms relating to one kind of sense impression are used to describe a sense impression of other kinds" (2004, 68) . Coenaesthesia designates "the potential and perception of one's whole sensorial being" (2004, 68) .
The main advantage of Voss's concept of the Leihkörper is that it carves out the connection between levels of description based in the primary structures of Sobchack and those that are based in cognitive-semantics and thus associated with plot, composition, characters, focalization, etc. Removing the fabula from its origin in the cinematic "text" and situating it instead in the cinematic Leihkörper makes it possible to emphasize both its cognitive-symbolic and corporal-affective dimensions without reducing the fabula to either the formal and stylistic features or to the cognitive and affective processes of the brain-body.
20
Memento allows us to experience cinematic narration as a process which does involve attempts to construct spatio-temporal and causal-linear coherency, yet not in the cognitively-analytically detached fashion automatically assumed by the analytical fabula of cognitive-formalism. Memento's narrative design calls provokes in the affect-emotion-cognition circuitry of the cinematic Leihkörper. The embodied fabula allows us to conceptualize the formation of cinematic narration as an amalgamation of the recursive interplay of several modes that are all integral to narrative comprehension. As I have argued in relation to Memento, these include corporal-affectivity (the dizzying temporal sensation, landscape, atmosphere, or mood, and the invocation of a particular mode of temporal reorganization connected with narration more broadly. In incorporating the cognitive-symbolic and analytical fabula into an embodied framework that shifts the focus to assemblages of cognitions, emotions, and affects rather than perceiving such according to an analytical principle of disjunction, I hope to have hinted at how the embodied fabula could be a useful conceptual tool for understanding the multimodality behind the narrative powers of Memento, which continues to intrigue cineastes and academics alike. 20 Although this article has focused on the concept of fabula, it is necessary not to forget its counterpart: the (understood as the actual arrangement of the visible and audible "events" of the narrative). It can be argued that the is equally misconstrued as the cognitive-analytical "facts" that "cue" us into constructing the fabula, since our ability to detect and designate such narrative "events" equally relies on our emotional-affective appreciation of the incoming stimuli. As Patrick Colm Hogan has argued: "Our isolation of something as an event and our attribution of a cause to that event are both crucially a function of emotional response, even if other systems are involved as well" (2012, 16) .
Conclusion
In reference to the complex dramaturgical architecture of Memento, I have proposed a reconceptualization of the cognitive-formalist concept of the fabula. Rather than being merely a perplexing cognitive puzzle, this article suggests that Memento's success should be found in how it embeds us into its themes of amnesia and identity loss. The main task in this relation has been to integrate the corporal and affective aspects of spectatorship as constitutive elements of the fabula rather than mere effects of our cognitive-inferential appropriation of the narrative. To circumvent the problematic disassociation of perception, action, cognition, emotion, and affect associated with the classical sandwich model of narrative comprehension, I have relocated the fabula inevitably bound up on both. This I have done in reference to the concepts of the cinesthetic subject (Sobchack) and the Leihkörper (Voss) with the particular aim of reconnecting the initial, phenomenological, and embodied experience with the higher-level cognitive-symbolic operations that I maintain are both vital ingredients for the emergence of narration. Although the scope of this article merely touches upon the outlines of this narratological tool, I hope to have made clear how the embodied fabula may contribute to draw our theoretical understanding of cinematic narration closer to the actual experiences we have in the cinema. Only from such
Memento realize the cinematic potential to enfold viewers into an audiovisual stream of complex temporalities, that demand to be understood in genuinely embodied terms.
